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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents (referred to hereinafter as Plaintiffs and 
Whiteleys) represent in their statement of facts that the Terry 
and JoAnne Bowns transaction was to close in the offices of 
Associated Title Company at which time the total amount owing to 
Defendants, plus the underlying obligation, were to be paid. In 
support of this factual statement they cite pages 458-59 of the 
record. That reference is to the trial court1s amended findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Paragraph 17 of that document 
recites that the closing of the transaction was to have been 
conducted in the offices of Associated Title Company Hat which 
time the unpaid loan balance owing to Western Savings & Loan was 
to be paid.11 (R. p. 258) . 
Thereafter paragraph 19 of that document states that 
Plaintiff John Whiteley telephoned Defendant Sidney Seftel and 
advised him that Whiteleys were prepared to pay the full amount 
that was then owing to Western Savings and such amount, if any# 
as may have been owing to Mr. and Mrs. Seftel. (R. p. 259). 
Neither of these findings nor any evidence in the 
record supports the Respondents ascertain that the total amounts 
owing to the Defendants were to be paid to them by Associated 
Title Company at the closing of the Bowns transaction. In fact, 
all evidence presented at trial supports the contrary conclusion 
1 
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that the Defendants were to receive nothing from Associated 
Title Company at the time of the closing. 
For example, part of the closing settlement statement 
introduced at trial as Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 11 recites that 
upon closing Western Savings and Loan was to be paid $44,370.01 
and the Plaintiffs were to receive $9,010.84. That document 
which represents the intended distribution and application of 
all proceed from the Bowns1 sale makes absolutely no reference 
or provision for any payment from Associated Title Company to 
Defendants. (Transcript p. 74, lines 15-19). 
In fact, although Whiteley testified that he was aware 
of the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and aware that 
under those terms Defendants were to receive monthly payments 
from the buyers on the first of each month, (Transcript p. 97, 
lines 9-16), he filed a Warranty Deed governing the property and 
attempted to complete the sale without paying anything to 
Defendants. (Transcript p. 97, lines 1-8). 
Plaintiffs also represented in their statement of facts 
that Whiteleys were ready, willing and able to pay Defendants 
the amount owing, if Whiteleys would have been able to determine 
that amount. That ascertain is contrary to the actual facts 
present in the record before this Court. Whiteley repeatedly 
testified that he was aware that monthly payments were due to 
2 
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Seftels under the Uniform Real Estate contract and that those 
payments were not made. (Transcript, p. 78, lines 9-14). 
As explained in direct testimony by Whiteley: 
A. Well, I told him he wanted to make full 
payment and through the proceeds of a sale. And, that 
it was, that the sale was in process and as soon as 
that sale was consummated, why, he would be fully paid 
whatever he had coming. And we wanted to do it that 
way rather tnan make the monthly payments that I told 
him within a month or two we expected to have the thing 
closed. (Transcript p. 80, lines 1-7). 
Again during cross examination, Whiteley reiterated 
that he was aware that monthly payments were due to Defendants 
and had not been paid. Specifically, he testified: 
Q. And at the time that that (Bowns) transaction 
was to take place which, I believe, was in March you 
were aware something was due and owing to Mr. Seftel: 
Is that correct? 
A. Yes, probably only the March payment, however. 
Q. The March payment. And you were aware you 
hadnft made that March payment; is that correct? 
A. Yes, and we informed the Title Company of that 
and Mr. Seftel. 
(Transcript p. 99, lines 9-16). 
Again and again in his testimony, Whiteley explained 
that he knew the amounts due to Defendants under the terms of 
the contract but chose not to pay them because of the pending 
AALD/ms 
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sale. see eg. (Transcript p. 108 lines 16-24; Transcript p. 
114, lines 12-25). 
The evidence is overwhelming that in relation to both 
the Bowns sale and the Beehive Title transaction, Whiteley was 
aware of the amount due to Defendants under the terms of the 
contract but chose not to pay that amount until Seftels released 
their interest in the property. The reason the Bowns sale did 
not close was that Seftels would not release their interest 
prior to receiving the required monthly payments and without 
making those payments prior to the sale Plaintiffs could not 
deliver clear title to the property. (Transcript p. 82, lines 
18-21; Transcript p. Ill, lines 18-22). Similarly, the monies 
held by Beehive Title were not released because Whiteleys could 
not deliver clear title to the property. (Transcript p. 57, 
lines 4-8). 
Therefore, Whiteleys failure to pay the monthly amounts 
as they came due was the actual cause for the Bowns sale not 
closing and the monies not being released from Beehive Title. 
ARGUMENT I 
DECLARATIONS MADE BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
THE TITLE COMPANIES DID NOT CONSTITUTE VALID TENDERS 
In support of the trial courts conclusion that 
declarations made by Plaintiffs and the two title companies 
4 
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constituted a valid tender, Plaintiffs argue that a valid tender 
does not require the actual production of the money due and 
owing. Rather, they reason that a tender is sufficient if a 
money equivalent is offered and amounts held or to be held by an 
escrow agent constitute the "equivalent of cash." 
Defendants do not believe that declarations of any type 
can constitute a valid tender of monies due and owing. 
Plaintiffs1 argument misconstrues the concept of tender in an 
attempt to justify the trial court's erroneous ruling. 
It is generally recognized that a mere offer to pay 
does not constitute a valid tender. A tender implies the 
physical act of offering the money or thing to be tendered. The 
accepted rule is that a legal tender requires an actual, 
present, physical offer of money or its equivalent and this 
presentment is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay. See 
Owens v. Idaho First Nat. Bankf 649 P.2d 1221, 1222 (Idaho App. 
1982) [quoting from 74 Am Jur. 2d Tender §7 at 549-50 (1974)]. 
This Court has adopted this general principal in Zions 
Properties, Inc. v. Holtf 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975) 
wherein it explained: 
A tender requires that there be a bona fide 
unconditional offer of payment of the amount of money 
due, coupled with an actual production of the money or 
its equivalent. What occurred was that plaintifffs 
president discussed with the defendants the prospect 
that payment would be made under certain conditions. 
5 
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But there was no actual tender of the amounts due under 
the contract within the foregoing definition. . . 
(footnote omitted, emphasis added) 
This Courtfs reference to money or its equivalent in 
that quotation referred to the physical object tendered, to wit, 
cash or a check, rather than the form of the presentment. See 
Parks Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 
1982). If this Court were to accept the rational proposed by 
Plaintiffs, it would be required to eliminate the second part of 
the above-quoted definition of tender, i.e., the actual delivery 
or physical presentment of money to the party. Suet a result 
would be in direct contradiction to the existing rule in this 
state and the rule of law generally accepted by all 
jurisdictions. 
Notwithstanding the questionable nature of the 
Appellees1 basic premise, their application of that premise to 
the facts of the present case is also clearly erroneous. In 
their argument Plaintiffs admit that Associated Title Company 
did not actually hold any money in escrow pending completion of 
the Bowns sale. Rather they explain that Associated Title 
Company, as a third party escrow agent, Hwould have held funds 
sufficient to make the payments11. . . had the Defendants 
informed them of the amounts then owing. 
Ignoring the "would have held11 nature of this statement 
the Plaintiffs ask this Court to conclude that the amounts "held 
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by the escrow agents were sufficient to constitute the requisite 
•equivalent to cash1". If Associated held no monies in escrow, 
a fact which is conceded by Plaintiffs, then the Plaintiff 
lacked the ability to immediately perform their offer. Yet, to 
constitute a valid tender the party making the tender must have 
the ability to effectuate immediate performance and that ability 
must be unfettered by conditional limitations. See Carpenter v. 
Riley, 675 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1984). As this Court stated in 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d at 1322; "There must be 
a bona fide, unconditional offer of payment coupled with the 
actual production of the money.11 
Because the monies were either not in the possession of 
Associated Title Company or if held could not be released prior 
to Defendants1 release of their interest in the property, the 
Plaintiffs could not immediately perform their offer even if 
such an offer was made. Similarly because the release of monies 
held by Beehive Title Company was conditioned upon the prior 
release of Defendants1 interest, the Plaintiffs had no ability 
to immediately perform the offer of payment relating to that 
money. (Transcript, p. 57, lines 1-14). 
However, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' contention 
that the alleged tenders were conditional cannot stand because 
Plaintiffs were prepared to perform in full, if Defendants were 
7 
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willing to live up to their contractual obligations. Yet 
Plaintiffs do not contest the fact that their offer of payment 
was conditioned upon the prior or simultaneous release by 
Defendants of their interest in the real property. This release 
therefore must be considered as constituting a condition to the 
Plaintiffs1 payment of the monies due. 
In Beckstead v. Smith, 656 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1982) this 
Court was asked to interpret identical terms in a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract concerning a seller's duty to convey title to 
the purchaser and held that under paragraph 19 of that and every 
similar Uniform Real Estate Contract, the sellerfs performance 
of conveyance is conditioned upon and not concurrent with the 
Buyer's performance of payment. Id. 656 P.2d at 1004. That 
holding is clear and the respective responsibilities and duties 
of parties under the type of contact present in this case is 
equally clear. The seller is not required to convey his 
interest in the property until all payments presently due under 
the contract have been made. 
There is no question that in the present case that 
monthly payments due to Defendants under the contract had not 
been paid when Plaintiffs informed Defendants that if they would 
release their interest those payments would be made. Such a 
AALD/ms 
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statement, even if it could constitute a presentment of monies 
must be viewed as conditional and therefore not a valid tender. 
In an effort to distinguish this Courts decision in 
Beckstead and get around the conditional nature of their tender, 
Plaintiffs argue that the oral declarations or offers of 
willingness to proceed found in the present case constituted a 
valid tender of performance which forced the Defendants to 
tender their performance. The obvious error in this reasoning 
is the elimination of the requirement that the Plaintiffs have 
the ability of performing immediately. 
Under the present facts and the conditional nature of 
the alleged escrow accounts, Plaintiffs could not perform upon 
their offer of payment until the Defendants released their 
interest. Therefore, notwithstanding the alleged offer to pay, 
the Plaintiffs could not present the money due to Defendants 
until after the Defendants conveyed their interest. 
This result is a stand-off. Plaintiffs can not deliver 
on their offer to pay until Defendants perform and Defendants 
are not required to perform until Plaintiffs deliver the money 
to them. This is the essence of a conditional tender and both 
the law of tender and this Courtfs decision in Beckstead require 
the Plaintiffs, as buyers, to eliminate the stalemate by 
unconditionally presenting the money to the sellers. Failing 
9 
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that unconditional act the Defendant have no obligation to 
perform by conveying the property* 
Therefore, because Plaintiffs did not present the 
actual money or its equivalent to Defendants, and offer 
unconditionally to immediately pay it over to them, no valid 
tender of the monthly payments due to Defendants was made by 
Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs also argue that notwithstanding the 
validity or invalidity of the tender, the Defendants1 failure to 
contest the trial courtfs conclusion that Whiteleys were excused 
from making a valid tender requires this Court affirm the lower 
courtfs ruling. The Defendants strongly contest the trial 
courtfs conclusion of law that Plaintiffs were excused from 
making a valid tender and presented their arguments against that 
conclusion in the following argument and in Argument II of 
Appellants• Brief. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT%S CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE 
EXCUSED FROM TENDERING MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In point 2 of their argument, Plaintiffs attempt to 
refute the Defendants1 ascertains that certain findings of fact 




The critical factual issues contested by the Defendants 
are the role played by Associated Title and the Plaintiffs 
knowledge of amounts due and owing to Defendants. In its first 
argument, Plaintiffs conceded that Associated Title "would have 
held funds" but in fact never actually received funds from any 
parties in relation to the Bowns1 sale. 
However, contrary to their earlier argument, Plaintiffs 
state in point 2 that Exhibit xl indicates that $53,961.00 was 
held by Associated Title Company at the critical time. Exhibit 
11 and the other evidence submitted at trial simply does not 
support that allegation. 
Concerning Plaintiffs knowledge of what was due and 
owing to Defendants, Whiteley testified at numerous times 
throughout the trial that he was aware that monthly payments 
were due under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
that they had not been paid. (Transcript p. 106, lines 15-21). 
Whiteley^ testimony on that issue is clear and uncontradicted: 
Q. Now, was there any time in March or April that 
you were not aware that the March and April payments 
were due? 
A. Again, we knew they were due. We thought we 
were paying them and every thing else. 
(Transcript p. 108, lines 16-20). 
* * * 





(Transcript p. 111-112, lines 25-2). 
In relation to the amount due and owing to Western 
Savings and Loan, Whiteley testified: 
Q. Did you every have any communication directly 
with Western Savings relative to the account balance 
what was owing? 
A. Yes, I had called there a time or two and got 
the payoff figures so I would be aware of what was owed 
them. 
(Transcript p. 84, liens 12-23). 
Plaintiffs knew exactly what was owed to that lender 
and they knew what was owed to Defendants under the express 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1 Under the terms of 
that contract, if the Plaintiffs had been current in their 
monthly payments then all payments due under the contract would 
have been made and Defendants would have been required to convey 
the property pursuant to the combined provisions of paragraph 8 
and 19 of the contract. 
The Plaintiffs, by their own admissions, testified they 
knew the amounts due and owing. By paying those amounts due to 
Defendants, Plaintiffs could have required the Defendants to 
convey the property. However, the Plaintiffs voluntarily chose 
iwhiteley testified that there was never a time from 
March 1985 until September 1985 when he did not know what was 




not to make the payments when due, but rather decided to wait 
until the property was sold to pay Defendants. (Transcript p. 
80, lines 1-7). Whiteley testified that he understood monies 
were due and owing under the contract and he knew the amount of 
that obligation but decided to withhold payment of those amounts 
until the proposed sale closed. (Transcript p. 108# lines 5-24). 
The Plaintiffs allegations that the Defendants failure 
to provide information to them frustrated the sales and excused 
their failure to tender the amounts due to Defendants is simply 
a smoke screen which is intended to divert attention away from 
the actual fact that with knowledge of the amounts due and owing 
Plaintiffs decided to withhold payment pending the completion of 
a sale of the property. 
The reason the proposed sales did not close was not the 
fact that Plaintiffs lacked knowledge of what was due and owing 
but rather the fact that Defendant would not release their 
interest in the property until they were paid. Because, 
Plaintiffs were unable to deliver clear title to the property 
they could not close the transaction. (Transcript p. Ill, lines 
20-22). That failure had nothing to do with the alleged refusal 
of Defendants to provide them with information concerning what 
was due under the contract.2 
2Plaintiffsf exhibit 11, which contained a hand written 
note contained in the files of Associated Title Company 
13 
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The trial courtfs findings to the contrary and its 
conclusion that Defendants1 failure to provide this information 
excused Plaintiffs from making a valid tender are not supported 
by substantive evidence and should be reversed on appeal. 
In discussing the concept of the implied covenant of 
good faith, which should prevent either party from impeding the 
others performance of his obligations, this Court has explained 
that this principle must have practical application. It is not, 
as this Court has previously stated, every minor failure, which 
could otherwise be remedied, which will justify non-performance. 
See Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d at 1321. 
The failure or refusal to tell a party to a contract 
something that he admittedly knows is not the kind of failure 
which will justify non-performance. The trial courtfs reliance 
on the alleged failure of Defendants to provide information as a 
basis for excusing the necessity of the Plaintiffs tendering 
2continued 
indicates that Sidney Seftel had in fact informed Associated in 
April of 1985 that two payments were due and owing to him under 
the contract in the amount of $486.00 each. At trial, Mr. Blake 
Heiner testified that the note was the kind of document that 
would normally appear in the file in response to a telephone 
conversation regarding the information contained thereon. 
(Transcript p. 70, lines 21-25). That evidence establishes that 
Associated Title Company as well as Plaintiffs were aware of the 
exact amount owed to Defendants prior to the scheduled closing 
of the Bowns sale. 
AALD/ms 
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monthly payments constitutes clear error which should be 
reversed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT III 
FAILURE TO PAY THE MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS RENDERED 
PLAINTIFFS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT AND 
RELIEVED DEFENDANTS OF THEIR DUTY TO CONVEY 
In their third argument, Plaintiffs contend they were 
not in default under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract although they had failed to make the required monthly 
payments. 
The Plaintiffs1 argument confuses the concept of 
default with that of termination or forfeiture. Under the 
express provisions of paragraph 16, of the contract, the Seller 
is required to give written notice to the buyer before being 
released from his obligations under the contract and terminating 
the contract pursuant to subparagraph A, of paragraph 16. 
However no such notice is required before a seller can enforce 
his right to payment of monthly installments under subparagraph 
B. 
Thus, if the Buyer is delinquent in his payments the 
Seller can bring an action to recover those payments without 
sending written notice to the buyer. If the buyer fails or 
refuses to make the payments required by the contract when due, 
15 
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he is in default under the terms of the contract. See Firemanfs 
Insurance Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974). 
If a party fails to make payments as required by the 
contract he is thereby in default in his performance and the 
condition of default exists. When that condition exists, the 
seller has a choice of remedies under paragraph 16 of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. In order to exercise two of the 
three available remedies the seller must give written notice of 
the default to the buyer and an opportunity to cure that 
condition. However, the act of giving notice does not create 
the buyers default. Rather, it merely conditions the remedies 
available to the seller following that default.3 
At the time the buyer becomes delinquent in his 
payments, he loses certain rights under the express terms of the 
contract. These rights are lost or suspended whether or not the 
seller gives him written notice of that default. Specifically, 
3The Plaintiffs admit they were delinquent or in 
default under the payment term of the contract but argue that 
the delinquency was occasioned by the tactics of the Defendants 
who had failed to pursue their contract remedies. This argument 
makes no sense. The Defendants had no affirmative obligation to 
pursue their remedies under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Their failure to give Plaintiffs written 
notice of the default could occasion or cause Plaintiffs1 
failure to make the monthly payments due under the contract. In 
fact, on two prior occasions, Defendants initiated actions to 
recover delinquent payments from the Plaintiffs. 
AALD/ms 
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under paragraph 19 the seller is relieved from his obligation to 
convey the property if he has not received the payments required 
to be paid by the buyer at the time and in the manner provided 
by the contract. See Beckstead v. Smith, 656 P.2d at 1004. 
In their present argument, Plaintiffs admit they were 
delinquent or in default. However they reason that Defendants1 
failure to provide them with written notice of this admitted 
default meant that they retained all their rights under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. This argument and the trial 
courtfs decision on this issue ignores the fact that the 
obligation to convey found in paragraph 8 of the contract is 
conditioned by the provisions of paragraph 19.4 cf Faulkner v. 
Farnsworthf 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). 
Under the terms of paragraph 19, Defendants were not 
required to convey title to Plaintiffs until the monthly 
payments were brought current by the Plaintiffs. During the 
trial, Whiteley admitted that at no time were they current in 
the payment of the monthly installments. Therefore, based on 
that admission and the express terms of the contract the 
Defendants could not be in breach of their obligation to convey 
title under paragraph 8 of the contract. 
4The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
Defendants breached the express covenant found in paragraph 8 of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract by refusing to deliver title to 
the property to Plaintiffs. 
AALD/ms 
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The question of what if any notice of default 
Defendants gave to Plaintiffs is totally immaterial to the 
resolution of this case and the determination of the parties 
rights under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The trial 
court's conclusion of law that Plaintiffs were not in default is 
unsupported by substantive evidence and contrary to the 
admissions of Plaintiffs that that they were in fact in 
default. The trial courtfs conclusions that Defendants were in 
breach of an express provisions of the contract by failing to 
convey the property to the Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs were 
not in default are clearly erroneous and should be reversed on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
TO PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In point 5 of their Brief, Plaintiffs argue that the 
trial court's aware of attorney's fees was proper. In Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986), this court 
expressed the rule of law followed in this jurisdiction that an 
award of attorney fees is improper when it is not based on the 
express terms contained in the parties agreement. Under Utah 
law, a party is entitled only to those fees resulting from its 
principal cause of action for which there is a contractual 
obligation for attorneys fees. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). 
AALD/ms 
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The Plaintiffs1 complaint in the present case sought an 
award of damages from Defendants on theories of negligence, 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
breach of contract, and punitive damages. The Plaintiffs9 
complaint did not seek to enforce the contract or require the 
Defendants to convey title but rather sought to recover damages 
against the Defendants and enjoin them from terminating the 
contract. 
Based on the Plaintiffs1 Complaint and the evidence 
presented at trial, the trial court found that Defendants had 
caused Plaintiffs no damages from the alleged breach of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. However, going outside the 
pleadings and acting pursuant to the authority vested in it by 
Rule 54(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court 
ordered Defendants to convey the property in question to 
Plaintiffs upon their payment of the delinquent monthly 
installments. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiffs were 
unable to prove that Defendants actions damaged them and that 
the Plaintiffs did not seek conveyance of the property in their 
complaint or subsequent pleadings, the trial court granted their 
request for attorney fees. And, although the trial court 
granted Defendants the relief requested by them in their 
counterclaim, to wit, payment of the delinquent installments, 
19 
AALD/ms 
that court refused to award Defendants their attorney fees or 
even present their counterclaim. 
There was absolutely no evidence presented at trial nor 
could any have been presented that Defendants would not have 
conveyed the property in question to Plaintiffs if the monthly 
payments had been made. 
It is inconceivable that the trial court would require 
Defendants to pay Plaintiffs1 attorneyfs fees incurred in the 
prosecution of a complaint that Plaintiffs could not recover 
damages under while at the same time deny Defendants their 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the contract. Not only is 
this contrary to this Court's prior decisions it is also 
inconsistent with the express terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract in question. 
Under the express terms of that contract, the buyer and 
seller each agree that should they default in any of the 
covenants or agreements contained herein, the defaulting party 
shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing the 
agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered 
thereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided thereunder or by the 
statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing a suit of otherwise. 
AALD/ms 
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As drafted and prosecuted, the Plaintiffs complaint was 
not directed at enforcing the agreement, obtaining possession of 
the property, or pursuing a remedy provided by the contract or 
the statutes of the State of Utah. Therefore, any award of 
attorneyfs fees to Plaintiffs was improper because it was not 
based on the terms contained in the contract and should be set 
aside on appeal. 
In addition, the testimony presented at trial by 
Plaintiffs in support of the award of attorney's fees did not 
differentiate between work done in furtherance of their alleged 
enforcement of the contract and attorneys fees expended in the 
prosecution of their damage claims or the defense of Defendants1 
counterclaim. 
An award of attorney's fees must be made on the basis 
of a finding of fact supported by evidence and an appropriate 
conclusion of law. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1985)• The evidence presented must not only address the total 
of the fees claimed, it must also establish the contractual 
basis for the award and detail the relationship between the 
contractual basis and the fees expended or incurred. See Forrel 
v. Reed, 560 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case the only evidence adduced by 
Plaintiffs in support of the trial court1s award of attorney's 
21 
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fees related to the amount thereof. Therefore in addition to 
the other arguments presented by Defendants, the total absence 
of any evidence connecting the fees awarded to the contract 
requires that the award of attorney's fees be set aside. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE TRIAL COURT1S JUDGMENT MODIFIED THE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AND ALLOWED DEFENDANTS ALL THEIR 
CONTRACT REMEDIES 
In point 7, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's 
granting of their motion for judgment vesting title in lieu of 
conveyance was proper because that courtfs initial injunction 
was in force pending the outcome of this appeal and the payments 
due under the contract had not been in default for 30 days at 
the time of the notice. 
The Defendants contend that the trial court's judgment 
must be read in conjunction with the preliminary injunction 
entered at the initiation of the case. In its judgment, the 
trial court ordered the Plaintiffs to make payment to Defendants 
of all delinquent amount within 15 days of the entry of the 
judgment. Defendants contend that at a minimum that order 
modified the earlier injunction and allowed the Plaintiffs an 
additional 15 days from the entry of judgment to make the 
payment. 
Previously in their arguments, Plaintiff have contended 
that the trial court %& judgment lfwas an order enforcing the 
22 
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contract." Thus, they must agree that following the entry of 
judgment the contract was in full force and effect. The 
Plaintiffs have also admitted in their arguments presented in 
this appeal that they were delinquent or in default of the 
monthly installment payments. It is obvious that their admitted 
delinquency had existed for a period longer than 30 days when 
the judgment was entered. Therefore their argument that 
paragraph 16 limited Defendants' right to give them notice of 
default is unfounded. 
If the trial court intended the injunction to extend 
without modification until the appeal was over or time for 
appeal had run as argued by Plaintiffs, the imposition of the 15 
day limitation would have been mere surplusage. Why would the 
trial court order the Plaintiffs to pay the monies within 15 
days of entry of the judgment if it did not intend to thereby 
modify its prior injunction? The Plaintiffs' argument that the 
trial court's prior injunction controlled its later judgment 
simply ignores the reality of the proceedings and the obvious 
intent of the trial court. 
Following Plaintiffs failure to make the payments 
required by the trial court in the required period of time, the 
Defendants should have been allowed to enforce all remedies 
available under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The trial 
courts granting of Plaintiffs motion for judgment vesting title 
23 
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in lieu of conveyance was improperly granted and should be set 
aside on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Courts award of attorneyfs fees to Plaintiff should 
be set aside and the case remanded for determination of the 
rights of the parties following the Plaintiffs failure to 
fulfill the terms of the judgment and pay the past due 
installments within 15 days of entry of the Judgment. In 
addition the trial courtfs dismissal of Defendants1 counterclaim 
should be set aside and the Defendants1 claims including their 
claim to an award of attorneyfs fees remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
Dated this /^^day of July, 1987. 
Daniel W.^Tackson 
Attorney for Appellants 
The Walker Center, Suite 560 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Crint O «>r ton #2482 
(Ml'ON & PEITKY 
Jtornoys for Plaintiffs 
j I Nil) East 331)0 South, Suite 102 
:;»il l Lake Ci ly, Utah 81 I Hi) 
Telephone: -187-5 8 15 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OE UTAH 
.l')ilN M. IVHITELKY, BARBARA ) 
MJII'ELEY, HLAM M\N VIEW-NT, I N C . , 
a Uti i l i C o r p o r a l i n n , ) C O VI P L \ I H T 
P l a i n t i f f s . ) 
vs ) 
•IDNEY SEI-TEL mid TIIKRSA ) 
ShlTEL, 
Civil NO ._C*$ir.CS_TtJ_ 
> •IudiJ° fcillC^C^,.. 
Dc fen ilnnts . »* 
Plaintiffs complain of defendants ami allege us follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
I. PI M int i I' f s , John M. While Icy and Barbara VVhiteley, are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff, Elan Management Inc., is a Utah Corporation 
with principal offices in Salt Liiki: City, Suit Lake County, Stale 
> I' Utah. 
3. The real properly which is the subject of this suit is 
loi'atod in Sail Lai;.' County, Utah, and is more particularly 
described as follow.-.: 
CO W.I I INC INC :i 7 7 . f» irol Nor Hi and 208.fi feet East of the 
Southwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 27, 
Tov.ush i p I South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
ami ruiiniii;; I hence South 236.4 feet; thence East 77 feel; 
lluuec Nor tn :»:)i;.l feel; I hence West 77 feet to I he 
place of l)c;{ i an i ng. 
(il'NKKM, AU.KCiATIONS 
4. 0<i or about January 8 t 1981 plaintiffs entered into 
a llu i form Heal Kslale Contract to sell the subject property to 
one, Handy l>. C a l l , with notice ol the contractual agreement 
b J njj reeorded in the office of t lie Salt LaJ<e C o u n t y R e c o r d e r 
on January 9, 19*} I in Hook 5 19!) at Page 12.14 (see copy of the 
Uniform lli'iil Hslalc Contract at I in* hed he I T to and hereby made a 
par t of this compIn i n I ) . 
f>. PursuaiM to the aforesaid Uniform Kent Kbtate Contract 
llu- defendants hid no remaining equity in the subject property 
since the balance due defendants under the contract was equal to 
an underlying tru^t deed note obligation to Western Savings and 
l.«* in C o m p a n y (set paragraphs '} and (} of the Uniform Real Estate 
To 11 m e t ) . 
fi. Hy siicis isive assignments of contract, the interest of 
|{ ni'ly l>. Cull in ih»* i>ub|ect property was conveyed to James II. 
It ••ns l from J time . II. Deans lo pint nt iff Barbara W h i t e l e y , and 
l i- MII plaintiff Ha r bar a Whiteley to plaintiff Elan M a n a g e m e n t , Inc. 
7. That dining the mouth of ivlarch 1985, plaintiff Barbara 
W h i t e l e y had an offei from a p r o s p e c t i v e buyer of the subject 
p r o p e r t y , and attempted individually, through her husband, 
pliintii'f John M. W h i t e l e y , and through Associated T i t l e C o m p a n y , 
lw obtain payoff figures from defendants nnd d e f e n d a n t s ' legal 
et.tnMci in order in eutiMimate a sale, whieh defendants would not 
an I did not prov i tie . 
8. That pursuant to paragraph B of the Uniform Ilea I H s t a t e 
Contract attached hereto, the buyer, i.e. plaintiffs by assignment 
of eonlruct, are entitled to a conveyance of the subject property 
subject to loans and mortgages "When the principal due ... has 
been reduced to the amount of any such loans and mortgages... 
9. That upon demand by plaintiff Barbara Whilely, deeds 
through successive contract buyers were recorded in the office of 
I lie Salt Lake County Recorder. 
10. That ofi or about May lf 1985 defendants caused a 
Complaint to be filed in litis Court against Handy 0. Call- and 
<b fendant John VI. Whileley dba Key Properties, alleging Uwtt 
tne deed conveying defendants 1 interest in the subject properly 
lo Randy l>. Call was violative of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between defendants and C a l l , and thai a subsequent transfer to 
pl-iinliff John M. Whileley creates a cloud on the legal title. 
'I his cause of action is still before the Court, and defendants 
hnve not pursued it further. 
11. That commencing in August of 1985 and continuing through 
the present date, plaintiffs, individually, and by and through 
ISct'hivc Title Company, and plaintiffs 1 attorneys have attempted to 
obtain a payoff figure from defendants in order to pay the 
outstanding inclebtednnss to the underlying mortgagee on the 
subject property, a* well as any amounts which defendants may have 
pn id the mortgagee. 
12. That on September 11, 1985 plaintiff John M. Whileley 
.tud Randy f>. Call received in the regular mail a letter dated 
Xu'jusi 2H, 1985 and inn i I ed on September 9, 1985 purporting to be a 
Notice of Default, which Notice w.is legally defective in that it 
Jid not comply with the notice requirements of Utah C o d e 
\nnotated. 
13. That plaintiffs did cause to be placed in escrow with 
iseehive Title Coi'ipany sums in excess of amounts necessary to pay 
off any verified payments made by defendants on behalf of the 
present fee owner, defendant Elan Management, Inc., or its 
oredecessors in interest and to pay off the underlying 
indebtedness on the subject property with Western Savings and 
Loan. 
It. That defendant, John M. Whiteley, and Hechive Title 
t'ifiipfjny notified defendants 1 attorneys that there were sufficient 
1'iouics in escrow to pay all amounts due and owing under the 
<*ontract9 but that to this date defendants 1 attorneys have not yet 
notified Heehive Title Company of amounts due and owing. 
15. That although repeated requests for payoff figures had 
been made of defendants and defendants 1 attorneys, no such figures 
w.-re givtfi to Randy D. Call or these plaintiffs until September 
2.J, I98l> on whi'h date a Notice to Quit and Notice of Forfeiture 
wrru served upon plaintiff Barbara Whiteley, the Notice of 
forfeiture for the first time Riving these plaintiffs notice of 
the amount of the alleged delinquency. 
IK. That these defendants were notified through their 
attorneys of (hi* urpolicy in paying off all amounts due under 
tin' coiilrurt b« eniise of u contemplated resale, and therefore 
• hould be h'ld liable for the damage proximately caused by 
ch'f ondan t s f actions, which whether neu 1 i gcMi I or intentional, 
have resulted in damage to these plaintiffs; 
17. Plaintiff* have* incurred legal fees and costs in 
connection with the prosecution of this action, which should 
be paid by defendants. 
F1UST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Negligence of Defendants 
18. Plaintiff reallege and incorporate by reference as 
tnough fully set forth herjein the allegations of paragraphs I 
through 17 above. 
19. Defendants owed pi aintiffs f as successors in interest 
to Handy I). C a l l , a duty to conclude the transaction contemplated 
in the referenced Uniform Real Estate Contract in a proper and 
conventional manner, with due care. 
20. Defendants were negligent and breached the duty owed 
to plaintiff by failing to conclude the contemplated transaction 
in a proper and conventional manner, with due care. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of 
defendants, plaintiffs, individually and jointly, have been 
damaged in an amount to be shown at trial, but in any evont not 
less than $100,01)0.00. 
2 2 . Plaintiffs are entitled to n judgment against defendants 
awarding damages in an amount to be shown at trial, but in any 
•vent not less than $100,000.00. 
WflliltiWOltK, plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
SECOND CLAIM FPU RELIEF 
Brciieh of Contract 
23. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as 
though fully set forth herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 17 above. 
24. Plaintiffs allege that at all limes material hereto 
they have stood ready, willing and able to perform under the 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
25. Plaintiffs allege thai defendants' actions as heretofore 
stated constitute a breach of their contractual obligations such 
as entitle plaintiffs to recover for actual and consequential 
damages as may be proved at trial. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
26. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as 
though fully set forth herein the allegations of paragraphs I 
through 17 above. 
27. Defendants impliedly covenanted with plaintiffs 1 
predecessor in interest, Randy D. Call, lo deal fairly and perform 
nil obligations arising under the within described Uniform Real 
Estate Contract in good faith. 
2 8 . Defendants 1 actions constitute a breach of their implied 
covenant of good and faith and fair dealing running to these 
plaintiffs under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
UHI\i{i\l;oi:K , (»l •••in! i l l ' s p r a y f o r j u d g m e n t a s ' ln»ro i im f I e r s e t 
i ' « » r t l i • 
Ti l il<l> iJLAl \1 1-4)11 U K L I K I ' 
K s t <>pj><* 1 
2."i. I M a i n l i f l ' s n - ' i l l r ; H ' a n d i n e o r p o r u t e by r e f e r e n c e a s 
i i m i i ^ h M i l l y s e t I o r l l i l i i T i M i i t h e a l l o c a t i o n s o f pa r nj j r 'n pli > I 
i h r i i i i | j l i 1 V a b o v < - . 
2*». D e f e n d a n t s 1 a c t i o n s as a b o v e a l l e g e d , w h e t h e r by 
* h e m s e I v es or t h r o u g h I h e i r a t t o r n e y s , nr*« s u e h a . s h o a l ' * ! pi'4»(? I u«le 
d e f e n d a n t s f r o m a s s e r t iu-.j a r i ^ h l t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o r p i ' ^ j u d i e e o f 
i he.»e p I *i i li t i I" I s . 
vvjiKdKrDKK , p l a i n t i f f s p r a y f o r j u d g m e n t is h e r o i na f t < r s e t 
: ut* t h . 
I 'TilllU'il C L A I M r i ) l { K L L h - h ' 
1*11 II i t i Vr l>ailla«JOS 
2 7 . I' I a i a I i f I %N r e a l l e g e nu I i n c o r p o r a t e h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e 
.!•» t h o u g h f u l l y r.et f o r I n t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f p a r a g r a p h : ; I t h r o U ; ' h 
I \ a b o v • • . 
2:>. I iec< iu- .e t i n - a r t s o f d e f e n d a n t s , i n d i v i d u a l l y m n t / o r by 
m i l I b r o a c h I In ; i r a t t o r n e y . - , , w e r > w i l l f u l , w a n t o n , a n d m a l i c i o u s , 
:»I a i n t i f f ••• a r e e n t i t l e d l o be a w a r d e d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t 
«le f e i i d a i i t s i n a n a i t i u a l it o I l e s s t h a n t h r e e t i m e s t h e u e t i l a l 
d o n a t e s s u f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f , w h i e h t r e b l e d a m o u n t i s e s t i m a t e * ! , 
• *a i a f M I iiia t i <>a t a d b e I i <• f , l o be u o l l e s s t h a n $ It II I)
 t I) Mil . II b . 
l i ! l L i : l \ l ; o i ; t ; , p l a i n t i f f s p r a y f o r j i icltfm.-i i l a s h e r e i na f t i-r s o l 
« o r i h . 
I n j unc t i vc K i _M e f 
2 4 . P l a i n t i f f s ri!;il k'i;o and i nror ptir a 1e by r e f e r e n c e as 
I h o u g h f u l l y sot forth h e r o i n tin nl l e g a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h s I 
! h r o u g h I 7 a b o v e • 
3 0 . Dcf e u d a n t s h a v e c o m m e n c e d legal- a c t i o n to JIM* I a r c a 
fore It? i l or e u n d e r parngi'?iph I fia of I !i o s u b j e c t U n i f o r m Heal K s t a t e 
* on t r a c t ; and w i l l p r o c e e d to d i s p o s s e s s p l a i n t ills to p l a i n t i f f s 1 
IIINIIIMJ i a t e and i r r e p a r a b l e injury and d a m a g e of p l a i n t i f f s w h o h a v e 
m» p l a i n , s p e e d y or a d e q u a t e r e m e d y at law u n l e s s s a i d d e f e n d a n t s 
.1 r e rest r a i n e d f r om I a k i u g s a id m-1 i on . 
.'i I . H a i n l i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d to a t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g or il«%r 
,*r e I i in i IIJIP y i n j u n c t i o n d u r i n g the p e n d a n c y of this a c t i o n 
r e s t r a i n i n g und e n j o i n i n g d e f e n d a n t s from eont inning a n y a c t i o n 
.!.»*! inst p l a i n t i f f from e n f o r c i n g the* f o r e f e i l u r e :iuc\/ov 
f o r e ft* i lure p r o v i s i o n s of p a r a g r a p h 1 tin of the a f o r e s a i d U n i f o r m 
i;«al K s t a t e C o n t r a c t . (M y i n t i f I s a r e f u r t h e r e n t i t l e d , at the 
• •one I us i on of this a c t i o n , to a p<?rinaucii t i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g 
i siii e n j o i n i n g s :i i d d e f e n d a n t s fr^m the eommeneetiicu I or 
."on t i una t i on of . m y a c t i o n a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s to c o l l e c t u n d e r 
t lit: a f o r e s a i d U n i f o r m keal Us late i o n t r a d . 
Wili-IUMI-'OifM, p l a i n t i f f s p r a y for r e l i e f a n d dt;i»aiid j u d g m e n t 
.ij^jinsl ijef e u d a n t s , a n ! e a c h of lliian, as f o l l o w s : 
i . on p i . n i i i i rrs 1 I-IKST n . u v i von KKLIKI-': 
a* For j u d g m e n t in favor of p l a i n t i f f s and a g a i n s t 
d e f e n d a n t s in an annniut to be delerniined at t r i a l , but not less 
i b a n $1 ill) , UtM). Iiu . 
I*# F o r i ' f /1 ' t t in . t i ' l • a t t o r n e y s 1 f e e s , a s etc-1 e r m i n e d Siy 
I in? (Jour I . 
2 . On p l a i n t i f f ' . ' .JKi ' iWD i ' l . A I M FOi: U K L U ' . I ' : 
n. I 'or j ud f;<iieii t i n f a v o r o f p l a i n t i f f s a n d a g a i n s t 
4ii-T t i j i l / i n t s i n mi amount t o IM- d f t i T i n i a«'il a t ( r i a l . 
L . I 'or i* «•.-!*; o iui i * I i* a t t o r n e y s ' f r r s , M S de1 « rm i a r d I • y 
i IM* ( ! O I I r I . 
:». On p l * i ir.t. i I ' l ' s 1 I II I •<!> I ' L M v l I 'm: K F U i - F : 
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I . On p l a i n t i f f s ' 1-OHUTil (-I.AI.V1 l \ i i * 1«KI. I Ml* : 
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